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Abstract
The posthoc verification protocol [J. F. Fitzsimons, M. Hajdusˇek, and T. Morimae, Physical Re-
view Letters 120, 040501 (2018)] enables an information-theoretically-sound non-interactive verifi-
cation of quantum computing, but the message from the prover to the verifier is quantum and the
verifier has to do single-qubit measurements. The Mahadev protocol removes these quantum parts,
but the soundness becomes the computational one. In this paper, we construct an information-
theoretically-sound non-interactive classical verification protocol for quantum computing with a
trusted center. The trusted center sends random BB84 states to the prover, and the classical
descriptions of these BB84 states to the verifier. The messages from the center to the prover and
the verifier are independent of the instance. By slightly modifying our protocol, we also construct
a non-interactive statistical zero-knowledge proof system for QMA with the trusted center.
∗ tomoyuki.morimae@yukawa.kyoto-u.ac.jp
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I. INTRODUCTION
Whether quantum computing is classically verifiable or not is one of the most important
open problems in quantum information [1–3]. There have been many partial solutions to
the open problem. These results are categorized into the following six types of approaches.
• Slightly quantum verifier: If the verifier can do some minimum quantum operations,
such as single-qubit generations or measurements, quantum computing can be veri-
fied [4–12].
• Multiple provers: If more than two provers who are entangled but not allowed to
communicate with each other are available, a classical verifier can verify quantum
computing [13–17].
• Computational soundness: If the LWE problem [18] is hard for polynomial-time quan-
tum computing, quantum computing is classically verifiable with the soundness against
a quantum polynomial-time prover [19–22].
• Sum-check: BQP is in IP, and therefore quantum computing is classically verifiable
with the computationally-unbounded prover. If we could modify the sum-check pro-
tocol for BQP problems in such a way that the honest prover’s computational power
is in quantum polynomial-time, the open problem is solved. There are two results in
this direction [23, 24].
• Specific problems: Several specific problems in BQP, such as the recursive Fourier
sampling, problems related to circuits in the second level of the Fourier hierarchy, and
calculating orders of solvable groups, are classically verifiable [25–28].
• Rational prover: For any BQP problem, it is possible to construct a rational proof
system [29] where a classical verifier sends a reward to the prover in such a way that
the prover who wants to maximize its profit has to send a correct solution to the
verifier [30, 31].
The simplest protocol in the first approach is so-called the posthoc verification [8]. (A
detailed explanation of the posthoc verification is given in Sec. II.) In this protocol, any BQP
problem can be verified in a non-interactive way with a verifier who can do only single-qubit
2
measurements: the prover sends a quantum state to the verifier, and the verifier measures
each qubit of the state. The prover can send each qubit of the state one by one, and the
verifier has only to measure each qubit sequentially, i.e., the verifier does not need any
quantum memory. The idea of the posthoc verification is based on the observations that the
local Hamiltonian problem is QMA-complete [32, 33], BQP is in QMA with a trivial witness
state (such as the all zero state), and the ground state of the local Hamiltonian (i.e., the
history state) can be constructed in quantum polynomial-time if the corresponding problem
is in BQP [8]. Because the 2-local XZ-Hamiltonian problem is QMA-complete [34, 35],
the verifier has only to measure randomly chosen two qubits in the computational or the
Hadamard basis.
A disadvantage of the posthoc protocol is, however, that the verifier has to do the quantum
measurements, and the quantum channel from the prover to the verifier is required. The
Mahadev’s breakthrough protocol [19] removes them by using the cryptographic technique,
but the soundness becomes the computational one, i.e., the protocol is an argument system.
In this paper, we show that if a trusted center is introduced, an information-theoretically-
sound non-interactive verification of quantum computing is possible for a classical verifier.
The trusted center sends random BB84 states to the prover, and their classical descrip-
tions to the verifier. (Because the BB84 states are uniformly random, center’s messages
are independent of the instance.) Introducing a trusted center that distributes BB84 states
is somehow an artificial assumption, but it is not unrealistic (for example, it is a foresee-
able future that the NIST distributes BB84 states among quantum computing companies
like Google, IBM, etc.), and the introduction of the trusted center gives us huge advan-
tages, namely, the classical verifier, the non-interactiveness, and the information-theoretical
soundness.
More precisely, for each instance x ∈ A of any promise problem A = (Ayes, Ano) in BQP,
we consider the protocol of Fig. 1, and show its completeness and soundness. (A proof is
given in Sec. III.)
Theorem 1 For any promise problem A = (Ayes, Ano) in BQP, the protocol of Fig. 1
satisfies both of the following with c and s such that c− s ≥ 1/poly(|x|):
• If x ∈ Ayes, there exists a quantum polynomial-time prover such that the acceptance
probability of the verifier is at least c.
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• If x ∈ Ano, the verifier’s acceptance probability is at most s for any prover (even for
computationally-unbounded prover).
1. The trusted center uniformly randomly chooses (h,m1, ...,mN ) ∈ {0, 1}
N+1, where N =
poly(|x|). The trusted center sends
⊗N
j=1(H
h|mj〉) to the prover. The trusted center sends
(h,m1, ...,mN ) to the verifier. Note that because (h,m1, ...,mN ) is uniformly randomly
chosen, the messages from the trusted center to the prover and the verifier are independent
of the instance x.
2. The prover does a POVM measurement, which can be done in quantum polynomial-time
if the prover is honest, on the received state, and sends the measurement result (a 2N -bit
classical bit string) to the verifier.
3. The verifier does a certain polynomial-time classical computation to make the decision,
accept/reject.
FIG. 1. A high-level description of our verification protocol.
Our classical verification protocol can also be modified to construct a non-interactive
statistical zero-knowledge proof system for QMA with the trusted center (Fig. 2). We show
its completeness, soundness, and statistical zero-knowledge property. (A proof is given in
Sec. IV.)
Theorem 2 For any promise problem A = (Ayes, Ano) in QMA, the protocol of Fig. 2
satisfies all of the following with c and s such that c− s ≥ 1/poly(|x|):
• If x ∈ Ayes, there exists a quantum polynomial-time prover (that receives a witness
state of QMA as input) such that the acceptance probability of the verifier is at least
c.
• If x ∈ Ano, the verifier’s acceptance probability is at most s for any prover (even for
computationally-unbounded prover).
• It is statistical zero-knowledge.
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1. The trusted center uniformly randomly chooses (h,m1, ...,mN ) ∈ {0, 1}
N+1, where N =
poly(|x|). The trusted center sends
⊗N
j=1(H
h|mj〉) to the prover. The trusted center
uniformly randomly chooses (a, b) such that 1 ≤ a < b ≤ N . The trusted center sends
(h, a, b,ma,mb) to the verifier.
2. The prover does a POVM measurement, which can be done in quantum polynomial-time
(given the witness state) if the prover is honest, on the received state, and sends the mea-
surement result (a 2N -bit classical bit string) to the verifier.
3. The verifier does a certain polynomial-time classical computation to make the decision,
accept/reject.
FIG. 2. A high-level description of our zero-knowledge protocol.
The idea is based on the recent elegant construction of zero-knowledge systems for QMA
in Ref. [36]. In their construction, the prover sends the verifier the one-time-padded ground
state of the Hamiltonian that corresponds to the encoded version of the verification circuit,
and a classical commitment of the one-time-pad key. After receiving a challenge from the
verifier, the prover opens only a small part of the ground state, which is enough to measure
energy but not enough to get any information about the witness due to the local simulata-
bility [36, 37]. A zero-knowledge system for QMA was first constructed in Ref. [38], and
improvements have been obtained recently [21, 36, 39].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we give preliminaries:
we review the posthoc verification protocol. In Sec. III, we show Theorem 1. In Sec. IV, we
show Theorem 2. Finally, we give discussions in Sec. V.
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II. PRELIMINARIES
Let A = (Ayes, Ano) be a promise problem in BQP. For any instance x ∈ A, we can
construct an N -qubit local Hamiltonian
H ≡
∑
i<j
pi,j
2
(I + si,jXi ⊗Xj
2
+
I + si,jZi ⊗ Zj
2
)
with N = poly(|x|) such that if x ∈ Ayes then the ground energy is less than α, and
if x ∈ Ano then the ground energy is larger than β with β − α ≥ 1/poly(|x|). Here,
pi,j > 0,
∑
i<j pi,j = 1, and si,j ∈ {+1,−1}. The posthoc protocol [8] runs as in Fig. 3.
Note that in this protocol, the verifier does not need any quantum memory, because the
verifier has only to measure each qubit sequentially. The verifier’s acceptance probability is
pacc = 1−Tr(ρH). Therefore, if x ∈ Ayes, pacc ≥ 1− α for an honest prover, and if x ∈ Ano,
pacc ≤ 1−β for any (computationally-unbounded) prover. The completeness-soundness gap
is (1− α)− (1 − β) = β − α ≥ 1/poly(|x|). It is easy to see that this protocol can be done
in the parallel way to amplify the completeness-soundness gap.
1. The prover sends an N -qubit state ρ to the verifier. (If the prover is honest, it is the ground
state of H.)
2. The verifier uniformly randomly chooses h ∈ {0, 1}.
3. If h = 0 (h = 1), the verifier measures all qubits of ρ in the computational (Hadamard)
basis. Let mj ∈ {0, 1} be the measurement result on the jth qubit.
4. The verifier samples (i, j) with probability pi,j.
5. If (−1)mi(−1)mj = −si,j, the verifier accepts. Otherwise, reject.
FIG. 3. The posthoc protocol [8].
There is a remark: In the original posthoc protocol [8], the verifier first samples (i, j) with
probability pi,j and measures ith and jth qubits. The protocol explained in Fig. 3 is slightly
modified from the original posthoc protocol in such a way that the verifier’s measurement
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is independent of the instance x. Such a modification was already done in Refs. [21, 36, 40],
and in fact the modification is crucial for our purpose, because the trusted center’s message
should be independent of the instance x.
III. PROOF OF THEOREM 1
In this section, we show Theorem 1. Let us first consider the protocol of Fig. 4 that
we call the virtual protocol 1. It is easy to see that the virtual protocol 1 has the same
completeness and soundness as those of the posthoc protocol (Fig. 3). Next let us consider
the protocol of Fig. 5 that we call the virtual protocol 2. The difference from the virtual
protocol 1 is that the verifier first measures halves of Bell pairs before sending other halves
to the prover. Because the verifier’s measurement and the prover’s measurement commute
with each other, verifier’s acceptance probability of the virtual protocol 2 is the same as
that of the virtual protocol 1. Finally, let us consider the protocol of Fig. 6, which is our
final protocol. The difference from the virtual protocol 2 is that the verifier’s quantum task
is done by the trusted center. It is clear that the verifier’s acceptance probability of this
protocol is the same as that of the virtual protocol 2. In conclusion, our protocol (Fig. 6)
has the same completeness and soundness as those of the posthoc protocol (Fig. 3).
IV. PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Our non-interactive statistical zero-knowledge proof system for QMA with the trusted
center is shown in Fig. 7. To show its completeness, soundness, and zero-knowledge property,
let us consider the protocol of Fig. 8, which we call the virtual zero-knowledge protocol. It
is easy to verify that protocols of Fig. 7 and Fig. 8 are the same. The verifier’s acceptance
probability in the virtual zero-knowledge protocol is pacc = 1 −
1
(N
2
)
Tr(ρH), and therefore
the completeness-soundness gap is 1/poly(|x|). The zero-knowledge property is also clear,
because in the virtual zero-knowledge protocol, what the verifier gets under the honest prover
are the uniformly randomly chosen (h, a, b, x, z), and the measurement results (ma, mb) on
the ath and bth qubits of the one-time padded history state in the base h that is simulatable
in classical polynomial-time due to the local simulatability of the history state [36, 37]. In
Fig. 9, we show the simulator. It is clear that the output of the simulator and verifier’s view
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1. The verifier uniformly randomly chooses h ∈ {0, 1}. The verifier generates N Bell pairs, and
sends halves to the prover.
2. If the prover is honest, the prover teleports the ground state of H to the verifier by using
the Bell pairs, and sends the verifier the information (x, z) ∈ {0, 1}N × {0, 1}N about the
byproduct caused by the teleportation. If the prover is malicious, the prover does any
POVM measurement {Πx,z}(x,z)∈{0,1}N×{0,1}N on the received states, and sends the result
(x, z) ∈ {0, 1}N × {0, 1}N of the POVM measurement to the verifier.
3. If h = 0 (h = 1), the verifier measures all qubits of the teleported state in the computational
(Hadamard) basis. Let mj ∈ {0, 1} be the measurement result of the jth qubit.
4. Let us definem′j ≡ mj⊕(hzj+(1−h)xj) for j = 1, 2, ..., N , which are the measurement results
that take into account the effects of the teleportation byproducts. The verifier samples (i, j)
with probability pi,j. The verifier accepts if and only if (−1)
m′i(−1)m
′
j = −si,j.
FIG. 4. The virtual protocol 1.
are negligibly close.
V. DISCUSSION
In this paper, we have constructed an information-theoretically-sound non-interactive
classical verification protocol for quantum computing with a trusted center. The trusted
center sends randomly chosen BB84 states to the prover, and their classical descriptions to
the verifier.
One might ask whether the quantum message from the center to the prover can be
replaced with a classical one. It will be impossible, because if it was possible, then BQP
is in AM, which is unlikely. To see it, assume that the trusted center sends some random
classical messages to the prover. Then, the message can be sent from the verifier instead of
the center, and it is a two-message AM protocol.
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1. The verifier uniformly randomly chooses h ∈ {0, 1}. The verifier generates N Bell pairs.
2. The verifier measures halves of the Bell pairs in the computational (Hadamard) basis if h = 0
(h = 1). Let mj ∈ {0, 1} be the measurement result for the jth Bell pair. The verifier sends
unmeasured halves of the Bell pairs to the prover.
3. The prover does a POVM measurement {Πx,z}(x,z)∈{0,1}N×{0,1}N , which corresponds to the
teleportation of the ground state when the prover is honest, on the received states, and sends
the result (x, z) ∈ {0, 1}N × {0, 1}N of the POVM measurement to the verifier.
4. The same as the step 4 of the virtual protocol 1.
FIG. 5. The virtual protocol 2.
1. The trusted center uniformly randomly chooses (h,m1, ...,mN ) ∈ {0, 1}
N+1. The trusted
center sends
⊗N
j=1(H
h|mj〉) to the prover. The trusted center sends (h,m1, ...,mN ) to the
verifier.
2. The same as the steps 3 and 4 of the virtual protocol 2.
FIG. 6. Our protocol.
The combination of the trusted center considerd in this paper and the Fitzsimons-Kashefi
protocol [4] also realizes the information-theoretically-sound classical verification of quantum
computing, but in that case, the protocol is interactive: polynomially-many rounds are
necessary between the prover and the verifier. Furthermore, the messages sent from the
trusted center do depend on the instance.
The trusted center’s task considered in this paper can be done by the “remote state
preparation” protocol. In the remote state preparation, the classical verifier can remotely
prepare random quantum states in the prover’s place with only a classical communication in
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1. The trusted center uniformly randomly chooses (h,m1, ...,mN ) ∈ {0, 1}
N+1. The trusted
center sends
⊗N
j=1(H
h|mj〉) to the prover. The trusted center uniformly randomly chooses
(a, b) such that 1 ≤ a < b ≤ N . The trusted center sends (h, a, b,ma,mb) to the verifier.
2. The same as the step 3 of the virtual protocol 2.
3. Let us define m′j ≡ mj ⊕ (hzj + (1 − h)xj) for j = a, b. The verifier samples (i, j) with
probability pi,j. If a 6= i, the verifier accepts. If b 6= j, the verifier accepts. If a = i and
b = j, the verifier accepts if and only if (−1)m
′
a(−1)m
′
b = −sa,b.
FIG. 7. The zero-knowledge protocol.
such a way that only the verifier knows which states are prepared. It is well known that if the
remote state preparation is possible, a classical verification of quantum computing is possible.
It is open whether an information-theoretically-sound remote state preparation is possible
or not, but it was shown recently that computationally-sound remote state preparations
are possible under the LWE assumption [20, 41–43]. If we combine these remote state
preparation protocols with our protocol, we would obtain a computationally-sound non-
interactive classical verification protocol for quantum computing with preprocessing.
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